The Adelet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) government in Turkey has made full use of terrorism legislation. Since 2007, it has been used to prosecute and imprison journalists, academics, military officers, the police, judiciary and political opponents. In short, terrorism legislation has closed off opposition voices within the Turkish political scene. It has also been used to justify the bombardment of civilians in the Kurdish east of the country but not used, to the same degree, against followers of the Islamic State. This paper uses Critical Terrorism Theory to examine the underlying power structures at play within this scenario. It takes a Critical Discourse Analysis methodology on public statements by senior government figures, including President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to argue that the Turkish government has redefined terrorist to mean "opponent" and thereby utilized it instrumentally to consolidate its political power. Furthermore, the AKP has used the legislation selectively in favour of those adhering to its religious identity. This inconsistent application of terrorism legislation exposes the varying allegiances in Turkish politics and can explain the current illiberal trend and volatility.
Hence, the paper concludes that this discursive strategy used by the AKP elite can be seen as another example of the authoritarian drift, which has been evident in Turkey since 2007.
It is both a symptom of it and a means of sustaining it in the short and medium term.
Critical Terrorism Studies and Securitisation theory
This paper draws on the critical terrorism theoretical framework of Jackson 1 . As such, it questions the presumptions of "problem solving" or positivist approaches to the theoretical study of terrorism and political violence. This critique has been based on two primary grounds: that the presumptive work was neither rigorous nor based on sound primary research; secondly it failed to address issues of power underlying the use of the "terrorism" label. If these questions were not asked, Jackson argued, then the underlying power relationships would not be revealed.
Jackson instead proposed an alternative approach to the study of political violence and "terrorism" which is based within a critical approach to political theory and questions the possibility of objective theory 2 . So-called Critical Terrorism Studies critiques the assumption of "facts" and asks instead in whose interest is it to have "factual" information on terrorism and in whose interest is it that a given state of affairs is an accepted status quo. Jackson urges the student of "terrorism" to look for the politics -power -behind seemingly neutral knowledge about political violence. Its epistemology is post positivist and instead of presuming that "knowledge" is possible it examines competing views of the world and investigates the power relationship between them. Ontologically it argues that whilst political violence is a reality, "terrorism" is a social construct "…decided by social agreement and inter subjective practices." 3 For as Bryan outlines, the notion of "terrorism" is not value free and is therefore a problematic term. It can also be tautologous and not related to the specific action carried out. "An act of violence is defined as terrorist not because of an analysis of the act but because a particular group are labelled as terrorist" 4 Moreover the ability of one group to label another terrorist is political because the "terrorist" label delegitimizes the motivation of the "terrorist" group. Bryan gives the example of the two sides in the northern Irish dispute in the UK. The nationalist Catholic side, the IRA (Irish Republican Army), were given the terrorist label but the unionist Protestant side, the UDA (Ulster Defence Association), much less so even though their tactics and the scale of their violence was similar. Hence Bryan and Jackson agree that it is vital to understand the power relationship inherent within the use of "terrorism" as a label in order to fully understand political violence.
"Crucially this defining process takes place within a web of power relationships whereby those with more power are able to define the acts of those with less power." 5 This paper also adopts the post-positivist approach to "terrorism". Furthermore, it does not preclude the state from being a "terrorist" actor and asks instead "….why, how and for what purpose do groups and individuals come to be named as terrorists and what consequences does this have?" In the study of terrorism there is no escaping the ethico-political content of the subject matter 6 . It is also crucial to understand that critical terrorism studies is not a "precise theory" but an "approach" to the study of political violence 7 . It covers a wide range of theories from thick Social Constructivism through Critical Theory and Post-Structuralism. This paper will specifically apply the securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School 8 which sits broadly at the thick social constructivist end of the spectrum of critical approaches.
Issues are not inherent security threats but become so "…by virtue of their presentation and acceptance as such…" 9 Securitisation theory posits that when something is deemed to 4 present an "existential threat" to what Buzan et al call the "referent object" it justifies an exceptional response to it. This is perhaps an obvious process when applied to a conventional military threat to a state (the referent object) which would justify the marshalling of troops and military hardware. Buzan et al argue that a similar logic can also be seen when "security" is defined more broadly to include political, environmental and social issues. Hence, with the Turkish state -and the AKP -as a referent object, "terrorism" and political violence can be seen as an existential threat and thereby securitized, or desecuritized, through "speech acts" according to the self-interests of the referent object. This retains a critical edge with the implication that the ability to "securitize" is a power relationship within a given context and this relationship needs to be highlighted.
Fundamentally, securitisation is a political process. This paper therefore looks at the use of the terrorism label, by the AK Party government, in Turkey since the latter half of 2014.
Critical Discourse Analysis
The methodology required to answer the research question relates to the theoretical and metatheoretical framework. Critical approaches to the study of terrorism presume a constructivist and interpretivist metatheoretical view. The questions asked by these theories seek, in varying ways, to establish the nature of the social construction of reality and the power relations therein, by deconstructing the language or "discourse". Hence, the methodology is needed to deconstruct the language to reveal these power relationships 10 .
However, just as critical approaches are not one thing but an "approach", so the discourse analysis applied by critical theorists is multifaceted and is a body of methodology -rather than a single entity -each driven by its theoretical presumptions. For this reason, van Dijk 11 urges proponents to view CDA as a body of work with the umbrella title of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) -rather than as a single methodology. These range from the "analysis of discourse" to definitively "Critical" Discourse Analysis (CDA). Within the variants, there are subcategories and the precise form of Critical Discourse Analysis, will depend on which aspect of a critical theoretical approach is taken. The actual method will vary according to the question being asked and that will depend on the theoretical framework chosen.
The notion of "discourse" is also contested or should be seen, at the very least, as a manifold concept. For the purposes of this paper "discourse" is viewed as the publically reported statements of the elite level of the AKP since 2014. It assumes that the speeches and public comments of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the one-time Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and Foreign Minister Mevlut Çavuşoğlu constitute an influential body of opinion in Turkish politics with the underlying presumption of language as social practice.
Erdoğan's discourse is particularly dominant and "helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo". In so doing it is "socially consequential and gives rise to important issues of power…" which "produce and reproduce unequal power relations". 12 However "discourse" is more than just stark text or talk, it is the discursive practice by which zeitgeists are created or boundaries, of what is normal or acceptable in a given time and space, are set.
Hence, "discourse" is a "multidimensional, multimodal and multifunctional phenomenon" which is created by the world around it which also influences the world around it 13 . In deconstructing the discourse of Erdoğan from a critical viewpoint, we are asking why this discourse is setting these particular boundaries of what is "true" or "normal". In whose interest is this particular zeitgeist? The Erdoğan discourse will be harvested from the Nexis media database from English language sources (primarily Agence France Presse) corroborated with Anatolia News Agency reports (in English). Specifically it will operationalize the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) 14 , which has an emphasis on discourse as indicated above within the wider context of the subject under scrutiny.
Types of terror in Turkey
The use of "terrorism" in public discourse has been an established feature of the Kurdish issue in Turkey since the late 1980s 15 . Moreover, the PKK has been on the USA State Department's list of terror organisations since 1997 16 and the EU's since 2001 17 , which has reinforced the international mainstream view of the PKK as "terrorists", rather than purveyors of political violence in the separatist cause 18 . Since 2007, however, the label of terrorism has been applied to groups outside of the PKK and this can be seen as a symptom of "authoritarian drift" in Turkish society 19 . Terrorism has been used as a means of prosecuting -and therefore silencing -critical, but also merely scrutinising voices. The initial phase of authoritarian drift -and instrumental use of the "terrorist" label -is evident since 2007 in the Ergenekon and subsequent Balyoz investigations, which first targeted the Kemalist military establishment elite before widening its net to include journalists and academics 20 . It is also evident after 2009 in the KCK investigations (Koma Civakên Kurdistan -Kurdish Communities' Union) in which practicing journalism about Kurdish issues was enough to be labelled a sympathiser and charged with terror offences 21 .
Such authoritarianism can be seen as part of the "backlash against democracy" across the world 22 . However, when considering authoritarianism in Turkey it should be noted that it is not a new phenomenon. The AKP is the latest in a long line of illiberal governments. Erdoğan justified this action by "demonising" 34 the Syrian Kurdish political party, the PYD which Ankara described as a "terror group just the same as the PKK..." 35 These comments implied that any assistance for the PYD against IS would be to assist the PKK in its insurgency against Turkish state forces. This conflated the PYD, and its militia, the YPG, with the PKK: whilst they have connections, political, operational and familial, they are not the same thing and were not acting for the same reasons. The PYD/YPG was involved in a civil war against the Syrian state, and also in an insurgency against a non-state actor (IS). The PKK's primary activity is as a separatist movement against the Turkish state.
Furthermore Erdoğan described the Free Syrian Army involvement as a "beneficial step" which would spoil the PYD's "scheme and trap" in Kobane 36 and this discourse was backed by the Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu 37 . This rhetoric led to an angry reaction in Kurdish areas of south east Turkey where it was felt the Syrian Kurds were being undermined by association with a proscribed terrorist group and left to their fate at the hands of Islamic State. This resulted in a "rise in the status" of both the PYD and the PKK amongst Syrian and Turkish Kurds and a corresponding loss of electoral support for the AKP 38 .
In so doing Erdoğan created a binary choice of "good Kurds" (Iraqi Peshmerga) and bad "The PYD does not want the Peshmerga to come. They don't want the Peshmerga to come to Kobane and dominate it. The PYD thinks its game will be spoilt if the Peshmerga come. Their setup will be ruined." 39 Hence in its reaction to Kobane the Turkish government labelled the PYD, a political party, as "terrorist" and sought to differentiate it from the Iraqi Peshmerga Kurdish forces for doing the same thing -defending the town of Kobane against Islamic State. In so doing the AKP government accepted the need for Kobane to be defended by Iraqi Peshmerga but appeared to seek to delegitimize the Syrian (and Turkish) Kurds' attempts to do so by rhetorically associating Syrian Kurdish actors with "terrorism" by associating them with the PKK which is internationally recognized as being a "terrorist" organisation. The AKP had the power and motivation to describe the political violence in self defence against Islamic State of the PYD and the YPG as "terrorism". The implication is that Erdoğan and the AKP saw the PYD as a political threat in the sense that territory gained might by an asset to the PKK in its conflict with the Turkish state and the discursive securitisation of the Syrian Kurdish groups has continued. Given the difficulties this "demonisation" of the Syrian Kurdish forces caused between Ankara and the USA, plus NATO, the only conclusion is that the PYD, and the wider Kurdish cause, were seen as both an existential threat to the AKP's electoral power base and a threat to the Turkish state's power and influence in northern Syria for the discursive strategy has continued. In January 2015 Erdoğan said he would not allow a "..terrorist group to establish camps in northern Syria" 40 ; in the summer of 2015 the Turkish state was targeting Kurdish facilities in norther Iraq as well as IS in Syria -and continuing to conflate the PYD, PKK and IS collectively as "terrorists" 41 . Following the bomb at a pro-Kurdish rally in Ankara in October 2015, which killed around 100 people and injured many more, Erdoğan attributed blame to a "terror collective" which, he said, included the PYD. November 1" 58 . He then offered a strong AKP government as an antidote to continuing unrest saying that "the people who threaten our country with arms and with bombs" would lead it "into the dark tunnels of terrorism" 59 .
Kurds (PKK/PYD/YPG
The effect of this was to associate the mainstream HDP political party with the political violence of the PKK and its military wing, the HPG (Hezen Parastina Gel -People's Defence Units) and this was made easier by the fact that Demirtaş' brother, Nurettin, was an active member of the PKK. In spite of the HDP's calls for a ceasefire and reopening of talks in the summer of 2015 it forced Selahattin Demirtaş to deny the HDP was "….a party of the PKK, nor its political wing." 60 The cumulative effect of this discourse undermined Demirtaş' credibility in Turkey and this was reflected in the November 2015 general election result.
Islamic State: de-securitisation to re-securitisation
This paper has sought to demonstrate the discursive strategy of the AKP government in Turkey towards the Kurdish affiliated groups the PYD/YPG in Syria and the HDP in Turkey. It has been argued that in both cases the label of "terrorism" was used to discredit them and utilizes the critical terrorism approach of Jackson (2005) by arguing that in both cases these groups were securitized instrumentally to benefit the referent object -AKP government. In this section the case of AKP discourse on Islamic State is examined to demonstrate how this process can also work in reverse. Discourse can also de-securitize an actor for instrumental benefit.
On October 10 th 2015 a suicide bomb attack on a rally in Ankara calling for peace in eastern Turkey killed more than 100 people and injured many more. The rally was progressive, proKurdish (and pro-HDP) and primarily called for an end to hostilities between the PKK and the attack had been carried out by a "terrorist collective" 61 and branded the HDP as an "accomplice" of the PKK 62 : "They have the audacity to speak of peace... but that means blood". 63 Having already associated the HDP with PKK terrorism, in so doing Erdoğan also discursively constructed the HDP as, by implication, a collaborator of Islamic State as well, notwithstanding the two groups' deep mutual animosity on many levels. This is in marked contrast to the AKP's discourse on Islamic State. After the Ankara bomb in October 2015, government sources identified the bomber as an IS operative with possible links to the Suruç (July 2015) bomber. However, whilst this was a public admission of the role of Islamic State in the Ankara bombing, senior government officials had also linked it to the PKK -even though it was a pro-Kurdish rally. Erdoğan spoke of the Ankara bombing as a "heinous attack" aimed at "…. our unity and our country's peace…" 64 with no acknowledgement of the primary political and ethnic -Kurdish -orientation, or sympathies for, of the majority of the victims. Instead it seemed to be an opportunity to damage the HDP's electoral chances by associating it with a terrorist act. 
Critical and scrutinising voices: Academics for Peace and Amnesty

International
It is further argued here that the discursive strategy seen so far with regard to the PYD and HDP has also been applied to less obvious critical voices in academia and civil society.
Around 2015/16, the terror rhetoric regarding the Kurds begins to blur with that against the Gülen movement (or FETÖ) and often those accused were not sure with which one they were being associated. This is especially true with regard to critical and scrutinising voices as opposed to political organisations. This paper will concentrate on these matters as they intersect with the Kurdish issue.
In January 2016 more than a thousand academics in Turkey, and beyond, signed a petition calling for an end to hostilities in eastern Turkey. The "academics for peace" (Barış İçin Erdoğan said the co-leaders should "pay the price" as "…we cannot accept statements calling for the country to be broken up. We will never agree to a state within a state." "I believe that the lifting of immunity of those against whom the cases have been initiated will help the atmosphere in our country in the fight against terror and hence it had instrumental value to the AKP. However, the referent object of this securitisation process is not the same in all cases. For the PYD, and later for IS, the referent object was the Turkish state and the general population whereas for the HDP and for civil society groups, the referent object is the AKP itself. In the case of the Syrian Kurdish PYD the referent object is the Turkish state. By association with the PKK the PYD is seen to be part of a movement which could strengthen the influence of the PKK and its desire for more autonomy within Turkey. Prima facie however, the PYDand its militia the YPG, were primarily involved in the Syrian Civil War -against both the Erdoğan has sought to position Turkey as a fellow victim of IS terrorism after the Paris and Brussels attacks -and a means through which to call on the EU to restrict the activities of Kurdish lobby groups in Brussels.
The referent object of the HDP, on the other hand was the AKP. When it won more than Lastly, since 2016 the terror label has been applied to areas of academia and civil society due to scrutinising or critical comments about human rights abuses on Kurdish issues. These groups are not active supporters of the PKK -and have no broad historical or familial affiliation which could be construed as such, as is the case with the HDP (and Demirtaş'
brother Nurettin for example). Instead they are said to be terrorist supporters merely for highlighting human rights abuses against civilians. By not actively supporting the AKP position they are opposing it -and by opposing it they are deemed to be supporting the Kurdish cause narrowly defined as "terrorism". In the case of the academics for peace petition this has served to quash freedom of speech on campuses across Turkey. Similarly the grounds for accusation of the Istanbul Amnesty employees was the expression of concern by Amnesty of human rights irregularities including the cases of Demirtaş and Yüksekdağ. In both cases this sends a wider deterrent message across academia and civil society and acts as a future deterrent to further scrutiny of AKP policy. It can therefore be seen as a deterrent to criticism of the AKP, the referent object in this particular case of securitisation.
Hence the AKP, as the ruling government with a parliamentary majority has had the power to label groups posing an external threat to the Turkish state or political opposition as terrorist and this has served as an effective way of limiting their influence and delegitimising the cause. At the same time it de-securitized Islamic State by downplaying its "terrorist"
status and conflating it with other terrorist groups, until it became impossible not to do so.
After that point it adopted a victim persona in solidarity with France and Belgium and tried to use this sympathy to further limit the activities of Kurdish lobby groups in Brussels.
The consequence has been that Turkey has become an illiberal state in which measures such as the rule of law and the right to free expression are clearly compromized by this abuse of power on terror legislation. It is used instrumentally by the state to bolster its own position -and specifically that of President Erdoğan. The inevitable deterrent effect of this strategy has further reduced the number of critical and/or scrutinising voices usually provided by political opposition and civil society including academia and already curtailed by the AKP domination of the news media. This is both a symptom of the authoritarianism of Erdoğan and a contributory factor to the sustainability of it.
Conclusion
The contention of this paper is that the AKP government has a discursive strategy which has used the "terror" label instrumentally: firstly to discredit domestic political and strategic opponents by associating them with the PKK and, secondly, to elicit sympathy for itself at home and abroad as a victim of Islamic State terrorism. In the case of the PYD this put them on the negative side of the good Kurd/bad Kurd divide with the Iraqi Peshmerga and stoked discontent in Turkish Kurdish areas as well because of IS activity in Kobane. Moreover, it justified Turkish military activity in northern Syria designed to prevent the Syrian Kurdish forces from establishing a power base. The electoral chances of the HDP in the second 2016 general election were hampered both by the resumption of hostilities between the Turkish state and the PKK and by Islamic State activity as well which the HDP was also discursively associated with. Furthermore, academics and human rights activists who expressed concern for civilian casualties of the eastern conflict have also been labelled as terrorist sympathisers. The creation of a binary distinction between the "state" and the "terrorists"
or terror sympathizers enabled their de-legitimisation in the AKP's favour.
This can be contrasted with a reluctance to apply the same terrorist discourse to Islamic
State until late 2015 in the face of considerable evidence to the contrary. Hence, the discursive strategy is to construct and deconstruct an association with "terror" activity instrumentally ie: there is securitisation and de-securitisation of "terror" to suit the interests of the AKP. Ironically in the case of Islamic State there was de-securitisation and then resecuritisation once the gravity of their violence, and the opportunity to present Turkey as one of several international victims of IS terror was clear. Theoretically, this would not be possible without the metatheoretical post-positivist presumption of a social reality created through discourse and the ability of language to contain power relationships.
In terms of securitisation theory both the Turkish state and the AKP can be seen as discursively placed referent objects. In this respect the strategy against the PYD can be seen as countering a threat to the Turkish state. However, it could also be viewed as countering academia and civil society are not such obvious discursive targets for the AKP's terror rhetoric and to do so has tested the credulity of Turkey's international interlocutors.
Moreover, the charges against them on Kurdish issues are increasingly being expediently conflated with the Gülen movement which further damages the liberal democratic credibility of the AKP government in international diplomatic circles, including the EU.
